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## RECENT CASES

ADVERSE POSSESSION—EVIDENCE—COLOR OF TITLE.—*LITTLE v. CRAWFORD, ET AL.*, 88 PAC. 974 (IDAHO).—*Held*, where C. was in possession of real estate and conveyed same by quit claim deed to L., and L. took possession thereof under claim and color of title, and held open, notorious, and adverse possession under such claim of title and made valuable improvements thereon, and paid all taxes assessed against said property for a period of more than five years, he secured title thereto by adverse title or prescription.

Color of title, in order to sustain a claim of adverse possession, may be shown by any paper which appears to have conveyed the land, and it is immaterial whether this paper actually conveys a good or bad title so long as the person claiming under it does so in good faith. *Unto v. Carpenter*, 21 Cal. 445. Where one is said to have color of title it is supposed that some act has been done which gives him title, good or bad. *St. Louis v. Gorman*, 29 Mo. 593. And where the title is colorable, and is held *bona fide* for a statutory period, it is sufficient to give the holder thereof the real title. *Abercrombie v. Baldwin*, 15 Ala. 363. Another case in the same state is directly in point and holds that color of title was sufficient to give the possessor the real title provided he received the land in good faith not knowing the title to be bad and that he resided thereon for the statutory period. *Goodson v. Brothers*, 111 Ala. 589.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—COMPROMISE BY ATTORNEY.—*SEBREE v. SEBREE, ET AL.*, 99 S. W. (KY.) 282.—*Held*, an attorney has no power to compromise his client's case without her consent. An attorney cannot compromise an action on payment of his costs, without the knowledge and consent of his client, unless specially authorized so to do. *Mandeville v. Reynolds*, 5 Hun. 338. An attorney cannot negotiate away a judgment by way of compromise, without the consent of his client. *Boyle v. Beattie*, 2 Cin. R. 490. An attorney, without express authority from his client, has no power to bind the latter, by a compromise judgment in a litigated suit for less than the amount demanded. *Senn. v. Joseph*, 106 Ala. 454. An attorney at law, conducting an action of ejectment cannot, without his client's consent, fix upon a boundary by way of compromise. *Mackey v. Adain*, 99 Pa. St. 143.

BOUNDARIES—FENCES.—ACQUIESCENCE, 109 N. E. 287 (IOWA).—*Held*, that where adjoining land owners treat a division fence as a boundary between their respective farms for a period of twenty years, the fence will ordinarily be regarded as marking the true boundary line between them. Tiffany in his work on real property lays down the proposition that when a fence is recognized as a partition fence the continued existence of such a fence will be regarded as an acquiescence that the fence in question forms the boundary. *Tiffany on Real Property*, Vol. I, 584. This proposition has been supported by the cases of *Darst v. Eulow*, 116 Ill. 475; *Jones v. Smith*, 64 N. Y. 180. A Vermont case has gone farther than this in holding that the mere acquiescence in a line as a dividing line for fifteen years, although but one